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Abstract—We investigate the optimality and power allocation
algorithm of beam domain transmission for single-cell massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems with a multi-
antenna passive eavesdropper. Focusing on the secure massive
MIMO downlink transmission with only statistical channel state
information of legitimate users and the eavesdropper at base
station, we introduce a lower bound on the achievable ergodic
secrecy sum-rate, from which we derive the condition for eigen-
vectors of the optimal input covariance matrices. The result shows
that beam domain transmission can achieve optimal performance
in terms of secrecy sum-rate lower bound maximization. For
the case of single-antenna legitimate users, we prove that it
is optimal to allocate no power to the beams where the beam
gains of the eavesdropper are stronger than those of legitimate
users in order to maximize the secrecy sum-rate lower bound.
Then, motivated by the concave-convex procedure and the large
dimension random matrix theory, we develop an efficient iterative
and convergent algorithm to optimize power allocation in the
beam domain. Numerical simulations demonstrate the tightness
of the secrecy sum-rate lower bound and the near-optimal
performance of the proposed iterative algorithm.
Index Terms—Beam domain, massive MIMO, physical layer
security, statistical channel state information (CSI), power allo-
cation.
I. INTRODUCTION
For developing the next generation of wireless communica-
tion system, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
is considered as a promising technology to achieve larger
gains in energy efficiency and spectral efficiency, and it has
attracted significant interest from industry and academia [1]–
[3]. Massive MIMO transmission employs a large number of
antennas at base station (BS) to serve a comparatively small
number of users simultaneously. In Marzetta’s pioneering
work [1], which considered non-cooperative massive MIMO
systems with single-antenna users and unlimited numbers of
BS antennas, it was proven that the effects of fast fading
and uncorrelated receiver noise vanish with the growth of the
number of BS antennas, and the residual interference, known
as pilot contamination, is induced by the reuse of the same
pilot signals among adjacent cells. Since the publication of [1],
various aspects of massive MIMO systems have been studied
in recent year [4]–[12].
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Owing to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
security is considered as a vital issue in wireless commu-
nication. Traditionally, key-based cryptographic techniques at
the network layer were utilized to achieve communication
security. However, these approaches are founded on certain
assumptions for computational complexity, and are hence
potentially vulnerable [13]. Recently, as a complement to
key-based cryptographic techniques, physical layer security
has attracted remarkable research interest, where information-
theoretic security is investigated. In Wyner’s pioneering work
[14], the wiretap channel, which consists of a transmitter, a
legitimate user and an eavesdropper, was considered. It was
revealed that if the the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded
version of the legitimate user’s channel, the transmitter can
reliably send private message to the legitimate user, while
the private message cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper.
Then, more research has investigated physical layer security of
multi-antenna systems [15]–[21]. As shown in [22]–[25], if the
transmitter only has the knowledge of the imperfect channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper, the security of
the data transmission can be enhanced by transmitting artificial
noise (AN) to disturb the decoding process at the eavesdropper.
Moreover, for MIMO wiretap channels, the problem to deter-
mine the optimal input covariance matrix which maximizes
the ergodic secrecy rate was studied in [26], [27], where only
statistical CSI of the legitimate user is required.
Recently, some works have been dedicated to investigating
physical layer security in massive MIMO systems. J. Zhu et
al. investigated massive MIMO transmission with a passive
eavesdropper [28], [29], where only imperfect CSI of the
legitimate users is available at the BS. An achievable secrecy
rate and outage probability with AN generation and matched
filter precoder at the BS was derived in [28], assuming that
the eavesdropper can perfectly cancel all interfering user
signals. The work in [28] was further extended to the scenarios
where the regular zero-forcing precoder and AN generation
are employed at the BS in [29]. K. Guo et al. proposed
three secure transmission schemes for single-cell multi-user
massive MIMO systems with distributed antennas in [30].
Moreover, Y. Wu et al. studied secure transmission strategies
for multi-cell massive MIMO systems, where a multi-antenna
active eavesdropper can actively send the same pilot sequence
as the users’ to induce pilot contamination at the BS [31].
In [28]–[31], results were obtained by the assumption that
instantaneous CSI of the legitimate users is available at BS
and the legitimate users are equipped with single-antenna.
The availability of instantaneous CSI at the transmitter
(CSIT) plays an important role in most existing transmis-
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2sion schemes for physical layer security. Actually, in time-
division duplex (TDD) communication systems, instantaneous
CSIT is acquired via uplink training phase under the re-
ciprocal channel assumption. However, for uplink/downlink
RF hardware chains, this reciprocity is invalid at both BS
and mobile transceivers [32]. Furthermore, the length of
pilot signal is essentially limited by the channel coherence
time. As for frequency-division duplex (FDD) communication
systems, where the reciprocity of instantaneous channel is
no longer valid, the required number of independent pilot
symbols for CSIT acquisition and the CSIT feedback overhead
scale with the number of BS antennas [33]. Consequently,
these practical limitations pose severe challenges to acquire
accurate instantaneous CSI of the legitimate channel at the
BS in both TDD and FDD systems. Moreover, as mobility
increases, the fluctuations of channel start to change more
rapidly, and the round-trip delays of the CSI acquisition turn to
be non-negligible with regard to the channel coherence time.
For this case, transmitters may acquire outdated instantaneous
CSI. Since the statistical channel parameters vary much more
slowly than the instantaneous channel parameters, it is more
reasonable to exploit the statistical CSIT for precoder design,
when transmitters cannot easily acquire accurate instantaneous
CSI. In addition, the uplink and downlink statistical CSIT
are usually reciprocal in both TDD and FDD systems [34].
Thus, the statistical CSIT can be acquired much more easily
by utilizing this channel reciprocity, even if the terminals are
equipped with multiple antennas.
C. Sun et al. proposed a beam domain transmission for
single-cell massive MIMO communications with only statis-
tical CSIT [9]. It was proven in [9] that beam domain trans-
mission is optimal for a sum-rate upper bound maximization.
However, the optimality of beam domain transmission for
secure transmission with a multiple antenna eavesdropper was
not provided in [9]. More importantly, the influence of the
eavesdropper to the optimal transmit power allocation has not
been studied in the literature to date.
In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission for
single-cell downlink massive MIMO systems with a multiple
antenna eavesdropper and multiple antenna legitimate users.
Statistical CSIT under the jointly correlated MIMO channel
model is considered. In massive MIMO systems, we note that
as the number of BS antennas increases, the eigenmatrices of
the channel transmit covariance matrices turn to be asymptoti-
cally unique and independent of mobile terminals [10]. For this
case, a lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy sum-
rate of the secure downlink transmission is derived. Numerical
simulations validate that the derived bound is tight in normal
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) ranges for practical applications
such as long-term evolution (LTE), WiFi, and WiMax. Based
on this lower bound, the condition for eigenvectors of the
optimal input covariance matrices which maximize the secrecy
sum-rate lower bound is derived. It is proved that the beam
domain transmission for single-cell downlink massive MIMO
systems with statistical CSIT [9] is optimal for secure massive
MIMO transmission in presence of a multiple antenna eaves-
dropper. As for the case of single-antenna legitimate users,
we prove that allocating power to the beams where the beam
gains of the eavesdropper are stronger than those of legitimate
users will decrease the secrecy sum-rate lower bound. Then,
we propose an efficient and fast iterative algorithm for power
allocation in beam domain by using concave-convex procedure
(CCCP) [35] and large dimension random matrix theory. Nu-
merical simulations demonstrate the near-optimal performance
of the proposed fast-convergent iterative algorithm.
Notation: Lower-case bold-face letters indicate vectors and
upper-case bold-face letters indicate matrices. The matrix
conjugate-transpose, conjugate, and transpose operations are
denoted by superscripts (·)H , (·)∗, and (·)T , respectively.
IN and 0N denote N × N dimensional identity matrix and
all-zero matrix, respectively. The subscript of the matrix is
omitted for brevity, when the dimension of the matrix is clear.
Also, tr (·) ,E {·}, and det(·) denote matrix trace, ensemble
expectation, and determinant operations, respectively. We use
A−1 and [·]mn to represent the inverse of matrix A and the
(m,n)th element of matrix A, respectively. A  0 indicates a
positive semidefinite Hermitian matrix A. diag (b) indicates a
diagonal matrix, whose main diagonal consists of the elements
of vector b.  stands for the Hadamard product, and [x]+
represents max{0, x}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure downlink transmission in a single-cell
massive MIMO system, cf. Fig. 1, consisting of an M -antenna
BS, K legitimate users, each with Nr antennas, and a passive
eavesdropper with Ne antennas. The BS transmits private and
independent messages to each legitimate user. All messages
are required to be confidential to the eavesdropper. We note
that neither the BS nor the users are assumed to know which
user is eavesdropped, hence, we assume that any user may be
potentially targeted by the eavesdropper.
BS User Eve
Fig. 1. Single-cell massive MIMO system with a multi-antenna passive
eavesdropper.
Let Hk ∈ CNr×M and Heve ∈ CNe×M denote the block
fading channel matrices of the downlink channels from the
BS to the kth user and the eavesdropper, respectively. The
received signals at the kth user and at the eavesdropper are
denoted by yk ∈ CNr×1 and yeve ∈ CNe×1, respectively, and
can be written as
yk = Hkxk +
∑
i 6=k
Hkxi + nk (1)
yeve =
∑
i
Hevexi + neve (2)
3where xk ∈ CM×1 denotes the signal vector transmitted to
the kth user which satisfies E {xk} = 0, E
{
xkx
H
k′
}
= 0
(k 6= k′), and E{xkxHk } = Qk ∈ CM×M . nk ∈ CNr×1
and neve ∈ CNe×1 are zero-mean circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian noise with covariance matrices INr and INe ,
respectively. Here, without loss of generality, we consider a
unit noise variance and assume that the BS has the power
constraint ∑
k
tr (Qk) ≤ P (3)
where P ≥ 0 depends on the BS power budget.
In this paper, the jointly correlated MIMO channel is
adopted, which jointly model the correlation properties at the
receiver and transmitter [36], [37]. Specifically, we can write
Hk = Ur,kGkV
H
t,k (4)
Heve = Ur,eveGeveV
H
t,eve (5)
where Ur,k ∈ CNr×Nr ,Ur,eve ∈ CNe×Ne ,Vt,k ∈ CM×M ,
and Vt,eve ∈ CM×M are deterministic unitary matrices,
Gk ∈ CNr×M and Geve ∈ CNe×M are random matrices with
zero-mean independent entries. In massive MIMO systems,
as M → ∞, unitary matrices Vt,k and Vt,eve tend to be
independent of mobile terminals and become a deterministic
unitary matrix V [9], [10], which is only dependent on
the topology of BS antenna array. Specially, if the BS is
equipped with the uniform linear array (ULA), V can be well
approximated by the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrix
[8]. Therefore, the beam domain channel matrices [9] can be
defined as
H˜k = HkV (6)
H˜eve = HeveV. (7)
Also, the eigenmode channel coupling matrices [36] can be
defined as
Ωk = E {Gk G∗k} (8)
Ωeve = E {Geve G∗eve} . (9)
The transmit correlation matrices can be expressed as
Rk = E
{
HHk Hk
}
= VR˜kV
H (10)
Reve = E
{
HHeveHeve
}
= VR˜eveV
H (11)
where R˜k ∈ CM×M and R˜eve ∈ CM×M are diagonal
matrices with [R˜k]mm =
∑Nr
n=1[Ωk]nm and [R˜eve]mm =∑Ne
n=1[Ωeve]nm.
Remark 1: The eigenmode channel coupling matrices Ωk of
the legitimate users and Ωeve of the eavesdropper are assumed
to be perfectly known at the BS [26], [27], [31]. From this
point of view, we notice that it is reasonable to assume that
the BS has the knowledge of the statistical CSI of the system
terminals in massive MIMO systems. Thus, this assumption
can be applied to the scenario where the BS aims to transmit
private messages to some users while treating an idle user of
the system as the eavesdropper.
In this paper, we assume that the legitimate users and the
eavesdropper have instantaneous CSI of their corresponding
channel matrices. At each legitimate user, we treat the ag-
gregate interference-plus-noise n′k =
∑
i6=k Hkxi + nk as
Gaussian noise with covariance matrix
Kk = I +
∑
i6=k
E
{
HkQiH
H
k
}
. (12)
Here, we assume the covariance matrix Kk is known at the
kth user. Besides, we make the pessimistic assumption that,
at the the eavesdropper, signals of all legitimate users can be
decoded and cancelled from the received signal yeve except
the signal transmitted to the user of interest. [28], [31]. Since
each user in the system has the risk of being eavesdropped, an
achievable ergodic secrecy sum-rate can be expressed as [18]
Rsec =
K∑
k=1
[Rk − Cevek ]+ (13)
where
Rk = E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k HkQkH
H
k
)}
(14)
and [31]
Cevek = E
{
log det
(
I + HeveQkH
H
eve
)}
(15)
where Rk denotes an achievable ergodic rate between the
BS and the kth user, and Cevek denotes the ergodic capacity
between the BS and the eavesdropper, which seeks to decode
the private messages intended for the kth user.
Notice that, in practical system, it is difficult to acquire
instantaneous HkQiHHk (i 6= k) at the kth user in massive
MIMO systems. Thus, we make an assumption that each le-
gitimate user treats n′k as a Gaussian noise and the covariance
matrix with expectation over Hk is known at each user’s side.
With this assumption, the matrix Kk defined in (12) is the
covariance matrix of n′k. Therefore, the ergodic rate defined
in (14) is reasonable for practice.
In general, the secrecy sum-rate given by (13) is a non-
concave function with respect to (Q1, · · · ,QK). Hence, it is
difficult to determine the optimal input covariance matrices
maximizing the exact secrecy sum-rate. Therefore, we intro-
duce a lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy sum-
rate, which is given by
Rsec,lb =
K∑
k=1
[Rk − Cevek,ub]+ (16)
where
Cevek,ub = log det (Keve,k) (17)
with Keve,k = I + E
{
HeveQkH
H
eve
}
. In (16), Jensen’s
inequality is adopted to obtain the upper bound of Cevek as
in (17) and consequently, a lower bound on the secrecy sum-
rate.
Then, we design the secure transmission strategies by op-
timizing the secrecy sum-rate lower bound. Our main objec-
tive is to design the input covariance matrices Q1, · · · ,QK
maximizing (16), which can be formulated as the following
optimization problem
[Qop1 , · · · ,QopK ] = arg max
Q1,··· ,QK
K∑
k=1
(
Rk − Cevek,ub
)
subject to tr
(
K∑
k=1
Qk
)
≤ P
Qk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K (18)
where (Qop1 , · · · ,QopK ) is the optimal solution of the problem
in (18). Because any negative term in the summation could
increase to zero by setting the corresponding Qk = 0, k =
1, · · · ,K, the notation [·]+ is ignored when solving the
problem in (18).
4III. OPTIMAL SECURE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we first investigate the optimal transmission
design based on the secrecy sum-rate lower bound in (16).
Then, we consider a special case, where each legitimate user
is equipped with single-antenna, and reveal the eavesdropper’s
impact on the optimal transmit power allocation.
A. Optimality of Beam Domain Transmission
Let Qk = ΦkΛkΦHk , where Φk is the eigenmatrix and
Λk is a diagonal matrix of the corresponding eigenvalues.
In practice, Φk and Λk represent the directions in which
signals are transmitted and the transmit power allocated onto
each direction, respectively. For the beam domain transmission
proposed in [9], Φk is set to be V, k = 1, ...,K. Next, we
prove that this beam domain transmission structure is optimal
for the secrecy sum-rate lower bound maximization problem
in (18). We obtain the optimal input covariance matrix Qopk
as follows.
Theorem 1: The eigenmatrix of the optimal input covari-
ance matrix of each legitimate user, maximizing the secrecy
sum-rate lower bound as given by (16), is equal to that of the
transmit correlation matrix of its own channel, i.e.,
Φk = V. (19)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2: From (19), the eigenmatrices of the input signals
maximizing the secrecy sum-rate lower bound are given by
the columns of V. This implies that beam domain secure
transmission is optimal for the lower bound maximization.
In addition, for a special case of the downlink multiuser
transmission without secrecy constraint where Heve = 0,
Theorem 1 reduces to the optimality condition derived in [9]
in terms of maximizing an upper bound of the sum-rate.
Inspired by the result in Theorem 1, we now focus on the
beam domain secure transmission. The received signals at the
kth user and the eavesdropper can be rewritten as
yk = HkVx˜k +
∑
i 6=k
HkVx˜i + nk
= H˜kx˜k +
∑
i 6=k
H˜kx˜i + nk (20)
yeve =
∑
i
HeveVx˜i + neve
=
∑
i
H˜evex˜i + neve (21)
where x˜k = VHxk is the beam domain transmitted signals
whose covariance matrix is Λk, and the power constraint can
be rewritten as
∑
k tr (Λk) ≤ P .
With Φk = V, K˜k = I +
∑
i6=k E
{
H˜kΛiH˜
H
k
}
, and
K˜eve,k = I + E
{
H˜eveΛkH˜
H
eve
}
, the secrecy sum-rate lower
bound in (16) can be rewritten as
Rsec,lb =
K∑
k=1
[
E
{
log det
(
I + K˜−1k H˜kΛkH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
K˜eve,k
)]+
. (22)
Theorem 1 provides an optimal transmit direction to maximize
the secrecy sum-rate lower bound based on the statistical CSI.
Next, we discuss the optimal transmit power allocation for
maximizing the lower bound.
B. Property of Optimal Power Allocation
Now we focus on the design of eigenvalues, i.e., the transmit
power on each beam. The power allocation problem can be
formulated as
[Λop1 ,· · ·,ΛopK ]=arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log det
(
K˜k+H˜kΛkH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
K˜k
)
− log det
(
K˜eve,k
))
subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K (23)
where (Λop1 , · · · ,ΛopK ) is the solution of the above optimiza-
tion problem. The original problem in (18) is equivalent to
the power allocation problem in (23). For obtaining insight
for transmit signal design, a lemma is introduced as follows.
Lemma 1: For a positive random variable x, it holds that
E
{
x
a+ bx
}
≤ E
{
x¯
a+ bx
}
(24)
where x¯ = E {x}, a > 0, and b > 0. The equality holds if
and only if x = x¯ with probability one for every x.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Unlike the power allocation problem without secrecy con-
straint in [9], for secure massive MIMO transmission, the
eavesdropper has impact on the optimal transmit power al-
location. In particular, for secure transmission among single-
antenna users, we can obtain the following theorem with the
help of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2: When each legitimate user is equipped with
single-antenna (Nr = 1), the solution of power allocation
problem in (23) holds
[Λopk ]mm = 0, if [R˜eve]mm ≥ [R˜k]mm. (25)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 reveals that the optimal transmitted beam sets
of different single-antenna users should not contain the beams
where the beam gains of the eavesdropper is stronger than
that of legitimate user. In other words, for the optimal power
allocation, power only should be allocated among the beams
where legitimate users have stronger beam gains than those of
the eavesdropper in order to maximize the secrecy sum-rate
lower bound.
In general, the optimal power allocation in (23) does not
have closed-form expression. In the next section, we will
provide an efficient algorithm to solve this problem.
IV. ITERATIVE ALGORITHM FOR POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, an efficient and fast iterative algorithm for
power allocation in (23) is developed. First, we transform the
original non-convex problem in (23) to a series of convex
programs by CCCP algorithm, which can be used to find the
5local optimum of the problem in (23). Next, in order to reduce
the computation complexity, the deterministic equivalent of the
secrecy sum-rate lower bound is utilized to develop an efficient
power allocation algorithm.
Obtaining the optimal power allocation in (23) is difficult
because of the difference of convex (d.c.) objective functions.
To tackle this problem, we introduce CCCP algorithm to solve
this power allocation problem. Define
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = E
{
log det
(
K˜k + H˜kΛkH˜
H
k
)}
(a)
= E
{
log det
(
K¯k + GkΛkG
H
k
)}
(26)
Rk,2(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = log det
(
K˜k
)
+ log det
(
K˜eve,k
)
(a)
= log det
(
K¯k
)
+ log det
(
K¯eve,k
)
(27)
where K¯k = I +
∑
i6=k E
{
GkΛiG
H
k
}
and K¯eve,k =
I + E
{
GeveΛkG
H
eve
}
. Here, (a) follows from the fact that
log det (I + AB) = log det (I + BA). Then, we exploit the
CCCP algorithm, which transforms the problem in (23) into a
series of convex programs as follows,[
Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K
]
= arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
∑
k
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
−
∑
k
tr
( ∂
∂Λk
∑
l
Rl,2(Λ(i)1 , · · · ,Λ(i)K )
)T
Λk

subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K. (28)
For the problem in (28), we note that the CCCP algo-
rithm is a majorize-minimize algorithm. In CCCP algorithm,
the concave part Rk,2 is linearized around the solution of
current iteration such that the objective function is concave
on (Λ1, · · · ,ΛK). Subsequently, the non-convex optimization
problem in (23) is tackled as a series of concave problem
in (28). However, without closed-form expression, evaluat-
ing Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) can be computationally cumbersome.
To evade Monte-Carlo averaging over the legitimate user
channels, we calculate the deterministic equivalent instead of
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) by large dimension random matrix theory.
Following the approach of [11], the closed-form expression of
the deterministic equivalent of (26) can be calculated as
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = log det (I + ΓkΛk)
+ log det
(
Γ˜k + K¯k
)
− tr
(
I− Φ˜−1k
)
(29)
where Γk ∈ CM×M and Γ˜k ∈ CNr×Nr are given by
Γk = ηk
(
Φ˜−1k K¯
−1
k
)
(30)
Γ˜k = η˜k
(
Φ−1k Λk
)
. (31)
Φ˜k ∈ CNr×Nr and Φk ∈ CM×M are obtain by the iterative
equations
Φ˜k = I + η˜k
(
Φ−1k Λk
)
K¯−1k (32)
Φk = I + ηk
(
Φ˜−1k K¯
−1
k
)
Λk. (33)
Moreover, η˜k(X) ∈ CNr×Nr and ηk(X˜) ∈ CM×M are
diagonal matrices, whose diagonal entries are given by
[η˜k(X)]nn =
M∑
m=1
[Ωk]nm[X]mm (34)
[ηk(X˜)]mm =
Nr∑
n=1
[Ωk]nm[X˜]nn. (35)
Thus, the deterministic equivalent of the secrecy sum-rate
lower bound can be expressed as
Rsec,lb =
K∑
k=1
[
Rk,1(Λ1,· · ·,ΛK)−Rk,2(Λ1,· · ·,ΛK)
]+
. (36)
Note that the deterministic equivalent Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
depends on the correlation matrices η˜k(X) and ηk(X˜) [11],
which can be calculated effectively. From [38], [39], we can
find that the deterministic equivalent Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) is
strictly concave on (Λ1, · · · ,ΛK). Thus, we turn to consider
the following series of convex programs instead of (28),[
Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K
]
= arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
∑
k
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
−
∑
k
tr
( ∂
∂Λk
∑
l
Rl,2(Λ(i)1 , · · · ,Λ(i)K )
)T
Λk

subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K. (37)
Remark 3: The sequence generated by (37) has proven to
be convergent and approximately optimal in [12]. We note
that the CCCP algorithm is an effective way to solve the d.c.
problem, where the solution of (28) is a local optimum of the
d.c. problem in (23). Meanwhile, with the purpose of com-
putation complexity reduction, we calculate the deterministic
equivalent of Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK). As will be shown in Section
V, the results of deterministic equivalent are nearly identical
to those of the Monte-Carlo simulation. Although the solution
of problem in (37) is an approximate solution of problem
in (28), calculating deterministic equivalent can significantly
reduce the computation complexity by avoiding Monte-Carlo
averaging over the channels.
Define diagonal matrices and sets as
∆
(i)
k =
∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇl,j
1+tr
(
Λ
(i)
\l Rˇl,j
)+ Ne∑
j=1
Rˇeve,j
1+tr
(
Λ
(i)
k Rˇeve,j
) (38)
Sk,m,l=
{(
l′,m′
)∣∣∣∣l′ 6= l, (l′,m′) 6=(k,m), l′∈{1,· · ·,K},
m′ ∈ {1, · · · ,M}} (39)
where Λ(i)\l =
∑
l′ 6=l Λ
(i)
l′ , Rˇl,j = diag (ωl,j), and Rˇeve,j =
diag (ωeve,j). Here, ωl,j and ωeve,j are the jth row of Ωl and
Ωeve, respectively. Based on (30)-(33), we can define Γ
(i+1)
k
and Γ˜(i+1)k by Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K , while letting the mth
diagonal entries of Γ(i+1)k , Γ˜
(i+1)
k , Rˇl,j , ∆
(i)
k and Λ
(i)
k be
γ
(i+1)
k,m , γ˜
(i+1)
k,m , rˇl,m,j , δ
(i)
k,m and λ
(i)
k,m, respectively. Utilizing
a similar procedure in [11], we can obtain the theorem as
follows.
Theorem 3: The solution of the iterative problem in (37) is
equivalent to that of the problem in (40)[
Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K
]
= arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
∑
k
(
log det
(
I + ΓkΛk
)
+ log det
(
Γ˜k + K¯k
)
− tr
(
∆
(i)
k Λk
))
6
γ
(i+1)
k,m
1+γ
(i+1)
k,m λ
(i+1)
k,m
+
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇl,m,j
γ˜
(i+1)
l,j +tr
(
Rˇl,jΛ
(i+1)
\l
) = δ(i)k,m + µ(i+1), µ(i+1) < ν(i+1)k,m − δ(i)k,m
λ
(i+1)
k,m = 0, µ
(i+1) ≥ ν(i+1)k,m − δ(i)k,m
(41)
subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K. (40)
The mth element λ(i+1)k,m of Λ
(i+1)
k satisfies (41), which is
given at the top of the next page. In (41), the auxiliary variable
ν
(i+1)
k,m is given by
ν
(i+1)
k,m = γ
(i+1)
k,m +
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇl,m,j
γ˜
(i+1)
l,j +
∑
(l′,m′)
∈Sk,m,l
rˇl,m′,jλ
(i+1)
l′,m′
(42)
and µ(i+1) is chosen to satisfy the KKT conditions
µ(i+1)
(
tr
(∑
k Λ
(i+1)
k
)
− P
)
= 0 and µ(i+1) ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 4: The solution (41) has the similar structure to
the classical water-filling solution. The distinction lies in
multiple terminals which causes a summation in the equation.
Thus, generally, it is difficult to obtain the solution (41) and
numerical approaches are required. For the case of K = 1
(single-user), if the power constraint tr
(∑
k Λ
(i+1)
k
)
= P
is considered, the solution is given by λ(i+1)k,m =
[
(δ
(i)
k,m +
µ(i+1))−1 − (γ(i+1)k,m )−1
]+
, where µ(i+1) is chosen to satisfy
the constraint tr
(∑
k Λ
(i+1)
k
)
= P .
For the sake of convenience, we define
C˜(i)(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) =
∑
k
(
log det
(
I + Γ
(i)
k Λk
)
+ log det
(
Γ˜
(i)
k + K¯k
)
− tr
(
∆
(i)
k Λk
))
(43)
ρ
(i)
k,m(xk,m) =
γ
(i)
k,m
1 + γ
(i)
k,mxk,m
− δ(i)k,m − µ
+
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇl,m,j
γ˜
(i)
l,j + rˇl,m,jxk,m +
∑
(l′,m′)
∈Sk,m,l
rˇl,m′,jx
(t)
l′,m′
(44)
ρ
′(i)
k,m(xk,m) = −
(γ
(i)
k,m)
2
(1 + γ
(i)
k,mxk,m)
2
−
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇ2l,m,j
(γ˜
(i)
l,j +rˇl,m,jxk,m+
∑
(l′,m′)
∈Sk,m,l
rˇl,m′,jx
(t)
l′,m′)
2
. (45)
Then, to acquire the solution of the iterative problem in
(40), a deterministic equivalent based iterative algorithm
is summarized as Algorithm 1, and specifically, to obtain
Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K in each iteration in Algorithm 1, the
iterative water-filling algorithm (IWFA) is utilized, which is
described in Algorithm 2.
For the convergence of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, owing
to the utilization of Algorithm 2 in each iteration of Algorithm
1, we first prove the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Deterministic equivalent based iterative algo-
rithm.
1: Initialize {Λ(0)1 , · · · ,Λ(0)K }, thresholds ξ1, ξ2, and set
iteration i = 0.
2: repeat
3: Initialize u = 0, and Φ˜(u)k .
4: repeat
5: Calculate Φ˜(u+1)k and Φ
(u+1)
k by (32) and (33).
6: set u = u+ 1.
7: until |Φ˜(u+1)k − Φ˜(u)k | ≤ ξ1.
8: Calculate Γ(i)k and Γ˜
(i)
k by (30) and (31), k = 1, · · ·,K.
9: Calculate ∆(i)k based on (38), k = 1, · · · ,K.
10: Utilize Algorithm 2 to update Λ(i+1)k , k = 1, · · · ,K.
11: Set i = i+ 1, and calculate R
(i)
sec,lb by (36).
12: until |R(i)sec,lb −R
(i−1)
sec,lb| ≤ ξ2.
We define C˜(i)max as the objective function value corresponding
to the solution Λ(i+1)1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K , which is the maximum of
the objective function of problem (40) in the ith iteration with
the power constraint
∑
k tr (Λk) ≤ P . Then, we can obtain
the following theorem for Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4: IWFA is a convergent algorithm, where the
sequence {C˜(i)(X(t)1 , · · · ,X(t)K )}∞t=0 generated in Algorithm
2 converges to C˜(i)max.
Proof: See Appendix E.
As for Algorithm 1, by using the monotonically increasing
property of CCCP, the sequence {Λ(i)1 , · · · ,Λ(i)K }∞i=0 gener-
ated by Algorithm 1 can be easily proven to be convergent.
Thus, the proof of the convergence of Algorithm 1 is omitted.
Remark 5: For the sake of the summation of fraction func-
tions, Newton’s method [40] is applied to obtain approximate
roots in Step 9 of the IWFA. In addition, in order to make
Algorithm 2 converge fast, we can update X(t+1)k with the
results X¯k obtained in Step 20 of IWFA if C˜(i)(X¯1, · · · , X¯K)
is increased, whereas the relation (85) suggests to update
with
(
1
KM X¯k +
KM−1
KM X
(t)
k
)
. To guarantee the convergence,
we still use
(
1
KM X¯k +
KM−1
KM X
(t)
k
)
to update when the
result C˜(i)(X¯1, · · · , X¯K) is not increasing in each iteration.
Also, to make Algorithm 1 converge fast, we can initialize
(Λ
(0)
1 , · · · ,Λ(0)K ) by allocating equal power among the non-
overlapping beams where the beam gains of legitimate users
are much stronger than those of the eavesdropper. Note that
simulations in the following section have demonstrated that
both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 can converge within a few
iterations.
Finally, we discuss the computational complexities of Al-
gorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. For each iteration in Algorithm
1, we utilize Algorithm 2 to obtain Λ(i+1)1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K . Since
the iterations of diagonal matrices Φ˜(u+1)k and Φ
(u+1)
k can
7Algorithm 2 Iterative water-filling algorithm.
1: Initialize diagonal matrices X(0)k = Λ
(i)
k , k = 1, · · · ,K,
C˜(i)(X
(0)
1 , · · · ,X(0)K ), and set iteration t = 0.
2: repeat
3: Initialize u = 0 and µ(u) = 0.
4: repeat
5: for k = 1 to K do
6: for m = 1 to M do
7: repeat
8: Calculate ρ(i)k,m(x
(w)
k,m) and ρ
′(i)
k,m(x
(w)
k,m) by
(44) and (45).
9: Update xk,m as
x
(w+1)
k,m = x
(w)
k,m − ρ(i)k,m(x(w)k,m)/ρ′(i)k,m(x(w)k,m).
10: Set w = w + 1.
11: until |x(w+1)k,m − x(w)k,m| ≤ ξ3
12: end for
13: end for
14: Update x¯k,m=[x
(w+1)
k,m ]
+, and Calculate
ptot =
∑
k,m
x¯k,m, k = 1, · · · ,K; m = 1, · · · ,M.
15: if µ(0) = 0 and ptot ≤ P then
16: go to Step 20.
17: end if
18: Update µ(u+1) = µ(u)+∆µ, where ∆µ can be obtain
as
∆µ = min
k,m
{∣∣∣ρ(i)k,m(x¯k,m+(P−ptot)/M)−ρ(i)k,m(x¯k,m)∣∣∣}
and set u = u+ 1.
19: until |P − ptot| ≤ ξ4.
20: Update x(t+1)k,m =
1
KM x¯k,m +
KM−1
KM x
(t)
k,m, k =
1, · · · ,K; m = 1, · · · ,M.
21: Set t = t+1, and calculate C˜(i)(X(t)1 ,· · ·,X(t)K ) by (43).
22: until∣∣∣C˜(i)(X(t)1 ,· · ·,X(t)K )− C˜(i)(X(t−1)1 ,· · ·,X(t−1)K )∣∣∣ ≤ ξ5.
23: Update Λ(i+1)k = X
t
k, k = 1, · · · ,K.
quickly converge and the complexity of calculating Φ˜(u+1)k
and Φ(u+1)k is relatively low, the major complexity for one iter-
ation of Algorithm 1 is constituted by the complexity of Algo-
rithm 2. As for Algorithm 2, we adopt Newton’s method [40]
to solve the equation, consisting of the summation of fraction
functions. If the precision is set to g digits, the convergence
of Newton’s method will require log g iterations [40]. For the
outer iteration of C˜(i)(X(t)1 , · · · ,X(t)K ) in Algorithm 2, it will
converge within a few iterations as the simulation illustration
in the following section. Thus, the complexity of one iteration
in Algorithm 1 will approximate to the complexity of inner
iteration of Algorithm 2, which is O(KM log g+KM). Then,
the whole complexity of Algorithm 1 can be approximated by
O(LKM log g + LKM), where L is the iteration times of
Algorithm 1. As shown in the next section, L is usually small.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to evaluate the
secrecy performance of the beam domain secure transmission.
Since the jointly correlated channel is a good approximation
for WINNER II channel model, we utilize the WINNER
II channel model to generate Hk and Heve. Note that the
WINNER II channel model is a geometry-based stochastic
channel model. In our simulations, the suburban scenario
under the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) condition is considered.
Both BS and terminals are equipped with ULAs. Neither
shadow fading nor path loss is considered. We consider the
legitimate users and the eavesdropper are uniformly distributed
within the cell. Here, in Step 1 in Algorithm 1, when initialize
(Λ
(0)
1 , · · · ,Λ(0)K ), we choose 16 strongest beams by comparing
[R˜k]
m
m − [R˜eve]mm, k = 1, · · · ,K, m = 1, · · · ,M . Then, we
allocate equal power among these beams.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the ergodic secrecy sum-rate and the lower bound.
Results are shown versus the SNRs of the WINNER II channel with M =
128, Nr = 4, Ne = 4, and K = 8. The deterministic equivalent of the lower
bound is also depicted.
Fig. 2 compares the ergodic secrecy sum-rate (13) with
its lower bound (16), which are evaluated by Monte-Carlo
simulations. Here, we consider M = 128, Nr = 4, Ne = 4,
and K = 8. We simulate from SNR = −10 dB to SNR = 20
dB. These are normal SNR ranges for practical applications
such as LTE, WiFi, and WiMax [41]. Fig. 2 illustrates that
the lower bound is quite tight in the considered SNR ranges.
Moreover, we compare the Monte-Carlo simulation results and
the deterministic equivalent of the lower bound given in (36).
We find that the deterministic equivalent results are nearly
identical to the Monte-Carlo simulation results, which is also
depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 compares the performance of Algorithm 1 against
that of the optimal power allocation for secrecy lower bound
maximization. Here, the optimal power allocation is obtained
by solving problem (23) by utilizing the optimization toolbox
in Matlab. For the sake of computational complexity, we set
M = 64, Nr = 4, Ne = 4, and K = 4. As shown in
Fig. 3, the performance of these methods are nearly identical,
which indicates the near-optimal performance of Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 3. Exact ergodic secrecy sum-rate for the proposed iterative power
allocation algorithm in Algorithm 1 and the solution of power allocation
problem (23). Results are shown versus the SNRs of the WINNER II channel
with M = 64, Nr = 4, Ne = 4, and K = 4.
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Fig. 4. Exact ergodic secrecy sum-rate for the proposed iterative power
allocation algorithm in Algorithm 1, the NS design in [31]. Here, instantaneous
CSIT is utilized in [31] while statistical CSIT is utilized in Algorithm 1.
Results are shown versus the SNRs of the WINNER II channel with M =
128, Nr = 1, Ne = 4,K = 12.
Furthermore, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is
much lower than the complexity of solving problem (23) by
optimization toolbox in Matlab.
Fig. 4 compares the performance of Algorithm 1 against that
of the null space (NS) design in [31] with M = 128, Nr =
1, Ne = 4, and K = 12. In the NS design, orthogonal
pilot sequences and matched filter precoding are used for K
single-antenna legitimate users, and artificial noise is not used.
Moreover, the NS design in [31] refers to transmitting in NS of
the transmit correlation matrix of the eavesdropper. Here, we
do not consider pilot contamination attack and the minimum
mean square estimate is adopted to obtain the instantaneous
CSIT of legitimate users. Note that instantaneous CSIT is
required in the NS design while Algorithm 1 only need
statistical CSIT. Our simulation results show that Algorithm
1 can achieve a much higher secrecy sum-rate at high SNR,
and the secrecy sum-rate performance of Algorithm 1 is only
slightly lower than that of the NS design at low SNR. This is
because the interference from other users has much influence
on secrecy sum-rate at high SNR, where power allocation
can be beneficial while matched filter precoding is unhelpful.
Furthermore, as with [31], transmitting in the NS of the
transmit correlation matrix of the eavesdropper is not a optimal
scheme. For the case of low SNR, since power allocation can
bring little secrecy sum-rate gain when the total transmitted
power is comparable to the noise power, the performance of
NS design is better, where instantaneous CSIT is utilized.
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Fig. 5. Convergence of Algorithm 1. Results are shown versus the iteration
times for different SNRs with M = 128, Nr = 4, Ne = 4, and K = 8.
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Fig. 6. Convergence of Algorithm 2. Results are shown versus the iteration
times for different SNRs with M = 128, Nr = 4, Ne = 4, and K = 8.
In order to further illustrate the performance of the algo-
rithms, the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively.
Here, we set the SNR as −10 dB, 0 dB, 10 dB and 20
9dB, respectively. For Algorithm 1, the optimal performance
can be approached after the first iteration at low SNR, and
the near-optimal performance can still be achieved with in a
few iterations at high SNR. From this result, we note that
the convergence of Algorithm 1 turns to be slower, as the
SNR increases. It is because that the total transmitted power
is comparable to the noise power at low SNR, which indicates
little secrecy sum-rate gain acquired from power allocation.
However, for the case of high SNR, since the interference from
other users has more effect on secrecy sum-rate, power allo-
cation can be helpful. Therefore, more iterations are required.
As for Algorithm 2, we can find that the proposed Algorithm 2
converges after only a few iterations, especially, the proposed
Algorithm 2 could achieve near-optimal performance after the
first iteration in all cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated downlink single-cell
massive MIMO transmission with a multi-antenna passive
eavesdropper, where only statistical CSI of legitimate users
and the eavesdropper is available at the BS. As the number
of BS antennas goes to infinity, the eigenmatrices of the
channel transmit covariance matrices turn to be identical and
independent of mobile terminals. Based on this characteristic,
we obtained the condition for eigenmatrix of the optimal input
covariance matrix to maximize secrecy sum-rate lower bound.
Our analysis showed that the eigenmatrix of the optimal input
covariance matrices, maximizing the secrecy sum-rate lower
bound, is equal to that of the transmit correlation matrix.
Thus, beam domain transmission, satisfying this condition,
can achieve optimal performance with respect to secrecy
sum-rate lower bound maximization. Also, for the case of
single-antenna legitimate users, we revealed that it is optimal
to allocate no power to the beams where the beam gains
of the eavesdropper are stronger than those of legitimate
users with the purpose of increasing the secrecy sum-rate
lower bound. In addition, for solving the power allocation
problem, we developed an efficient iterative and convergent
algorithm. The tightness of the secrecy sum-rate lower bound
and the near-optimal performance of the proposed iterative
algorithms which converge rapidly were demonstrated through
simulations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From the definition of the beam domain channel in (6)
and (7), the objective function of the problem in (18) can
be expressed as
R(Q˜1, · · · , Q˜K) =
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k H˜kQ˜kH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
Keve,k
))
(46)
where Q˜k = VHQkV, k = 1, · · · ,K.
Utilizing the fact that random matrices H˜k (H˜eve) are
column-independent with zero-mean entries, we have
Kk = I +
∑
i6=k
E
{
HkQiH
H
k
}
= I +
∑
i 6=k
E
{
H˜kQ˜iH˜
H
k
}
= I +
∑
i 6=k
E
{
H˜kΞiH˜
H
k
}
(47)
Keve,k = I + E
{
HeveQkH
H
eve
}
= I + E
{
H˜eveQ˜kH˜
H
eve
}
= I + E
{
H˜eveΞkH˜
H
eve
}
(48)
with Ξk = Q˜k  I (k = 1, · · · ,K). Thus, the off-diagonal
entries of Q˜1, · · · , Q˜K do not affect the value of matrices Kk
and Keve,k.
Then, using a similar technique in [42], we define Πm ∈
CM×M as a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are
1 except the (m,m)th entry, which is −1. The entries of
ΠmQ˜kΠm are equivalent to those of Q˜k except the off-
diagonals in the mth row and mth column, whose sign is
reversed. Therefore, ΠmQ˜kΠm  I = Q˜k  I = Ξk. Using
equations (47) and (48), we have
R
(
Q˜1,· · ·, Q˜K
)
=
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k H˜kQ˜kH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
Keve,k
))
(a)
=
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k H˜kΠmQ˜kΠmH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
Keve,k
))
= R
(
ΠmQ˜1Πm, · · · ,ΠmQ˜KΠm
)
(49)
where (a) follows from the fact that reversing the sign of the
mth column does not change its distribution. It is because that
the columns of H˜k are independent and their distributions are
symmetric. Note the matrix 12
(
Q˜k + ΠmQ˜kΠm
)
has entries
equal to those of Q˜k except for the off diagonal entries in the
mth row and mth column, which are 0. Moreover, due to the
concavity of log det (·), we can invoke Jensen’s inequality,
R
(
1
2
(
Q˜1 + ΠmQ˜1Πm
)
,· · ·, 1
2
(
Q˜K + ΠmQ˜KΠm
))
=
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log det
(
I+
1
2
K−1k H˜k
(
Q˜k+ΠmQ˜kΠm
)
H˜Hk
)}
− log det
(
Keve,k
))
≥
K∑
k=1
(
1
2
E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k H˜kQ˜kH˜
H
k
)}
+
1
2
E
{
log det
(
I + K−1k H˜kΠmQ˜kΠmH˜
H
k
)}
− log det
(
Keve,k
))
=
1
2
R
(
Q˜1,· · ·, Q˜K
)
+
1
2
R
(
ΠmQ˜1Πm,· · ·,ΠmQ˜KΠm
)
= R
(
Q˜1, · · · , Q˜K
)
. (50)
Note that nulling the off diagonal entries of any row and
10
column of Q˜1, · · · , Q˜K will increase the secrecy sum-rate
lower bound in (46). Repeating this process for m from 1 to
M , we find that (46) is maximized when Q˜1, · · · , Q˜K all are
diagonal, which indicates that Φk = V. This concludes the
proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We need to prove that
E
{
x
a+ bx
}
− E
{
x¯
a+ bx
}
≤ 0 (51)
where a > 0, b > 0, and x¯ = E {x}. By using Jensen’s
inequality, we have
E
{
x
a+ bx
}
− E
{
x¯
a+ bx
}
=E
{
x− x¯
a+ bx
}
≤ E {x} − x¯
a+ bE {x}
=
x¯− x¯
a+ bE {x}
=0 (52)
where the inequality follows from the fact that x−x¯a+bx is a
strictly concave function with regard to x on x ≥ 0. The
equality holds if and only if x = x¯ with probability one for
every x.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For Nr = 1, the optimization problem in (23) can be
rewritten as
arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log
(
1 + h˜Hk Λkh˜k + tr
(
Λ\kR˜k
))}
− log
(
1+tr
(
Λ\kR˜k
))
−
Ne∑
j=1
log
(
1+tr
(
ΛkRˇeve,j
)))
subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K (53)
where Λ\k =
∑
k′ 6=k Λk′ , h˜k = [h˜k,1, · · · , h˜k,M ]T , and
Rˇeve,j = diag (ωeve,j). Here, ωeve,j is the jth row of matrix
Ωeve.
Let diagonal matrices Ψk and µ be the Lagrange multipliers,
and the cost function can expressed as
L =
K∑
k=1
(
E
{
log
(
1 + h˜Hk Λkh˜k + tr
(
Λ\kR˜k
))}
− log
(
1+tr
(
Λ\kR˜k
))
−
Ne∑
j=1
log
(
1 + tr
(
ΛkRˇeve,j
)))
+
∑
k
tr (ΨkΛk)− µ
(∑
k
tr (Λk)− P
)
. (54)
Then, let r˜k,m, rˇeve,j,m, ψ
op
k,m, and λ
op
m be the mth diagonal
entry of R˜k, Rˇeve,j , Ψ
op
k , and Λ
op
k , respectively. The Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the optimal λopk,m, ψ
op
k,m,
and µop can be expressed as
∂L
∂λopk,m
= E
 h˜k,mh˜∗k,m1 + h˜Hk Λopk h˜k + tr(Λop\kR˜k)

−
Ne∑
j=1
rˇeve,j,m
1+tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
) −∑
k′ 6=k
 r˜k′,m
1 + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)
−E
 r˜k′,m1+h˜Hk′Λopk′ h˜k′+tr(Λop\k′R˜k′)

+ψopk,m−µop =0 (55)
ψopk,mλ
op
k,m=0, µ
op
(∑
k
tr (Λopk )−P
)
=0, ψopk,m ≥0 (56)
µop ≥ 0, λopk,m ≥ 0, k = 1, · · · ,K; m = 1, · · · ,M. (57)
Multiplying equation (55) both sides by λopk,m and utilizing
the condition ψopk,mλ
op
k,m = 0, we have
µopλopk,m = E
 λ
op
k,mh˜k,mh˜
∗
k,m
1 + h˜Hk Λ
op
k h˜k + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)

−
Ne∑
j=1
λopk,mrˇeve,j,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)
−
∑
k′ 6=k
 λopk,mr˜k′,m
1 + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)
− E
 λ
op
k,mr˜k′,m
1 + h˜Hk′Λ
op
k′ h˜k′ + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)

 . (58)
Repeat this process for m from 1 to M and summate, we can
obtain (59) at the top of the next page.
Due to the conditions µop ≥ 0 and λopk,m ≥ 0, it is east to
find that
µoptr (Λopk ) ≥ 0. (60)
Furthermore, observing the equation (59), we have
M∑
m=1
∑
k′ 6=k
 λopk,mr˜k′,m
1 + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)
−E
 λ
op
k,mr˜k′,m
1 + h˜Hk′Λ
op
k′ h˜k′ + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)

 ≥ 0. (61)
Thus, combining (59)-(61), we can obtain the following in-
equalities
1− E
 1 + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)
1 + h˜Hk Λ
op
k h˜k + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)

− max
j=1,··· ,Ne
(
1− 1
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
))
≥1− E
 1 + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)
1 + h˜Hk Λ
op
k h˜k + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)

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µoptr (Λopk ) =
M∑
m=1
E
 λ
op
k,mh˜k,mh˜
∗
k,m
1 + h˜Hk Λ
op
k h˜k + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)
 −
Ne∑
j=1
λopk,mrˇeve,j,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)
−
∑
k′ 6=k
 λopk,mr˜k′,m
1 + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
) −E
 λ
op
k,mr˜k′,m
1 + h˜Hk′Λ
op
k′ h˜k′ + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)


= 1− E
 1 + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)
1 + h˜Hk Λ
op
k h˜k + tr
(
Λop\kR˜k
)
−
Ne∑
j=1
(
1− 1
1+tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
))
−
M∑
m=1
∑
k′ 6=k
 λopk,mr˜k′,m
1+tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
) − E
 λ
op
k,mr˜k′,m
1 + h˜Hk′Λ
op
k′ h˜k′ + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
)

 (59)
µop = E
 h˜k,mh˜∗k,m1 + h˜Hk Λopk h˜k + tr(Λop\kR˜k)
−
Ne∑
j=1
rˇeve,j,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)
−
∑
k′ 6=k
 r˜k′,m
1 + tr
(
Λop\k′R˜k′
) −E
 r˜k′,m1 + h˜Hk′Λopk′ h˜k′ + tr(Λop\k′R˜k′)


≤ E
 h˜k,mh˜∗k,m1 + h˜Hk Λopk h˜k + tr(Λop\kR˜k)
−
Ne∑
j=1
rˇeve,j,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)
(a)
< E
 r˜k,m1 + h˜Hk Λopk h˜k + tr(Λop\kR˜k)
−
Ne∑
j=1
rˇeve,j,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)
(b)
≤ r˜k,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,jm
) − r˜eve,m
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,jm
)
≤ 0. (66)
−
Ne∑
j=1
(
1− 1
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
))
≥0. (62)
Here, without loss of generality, we suppose that
jm = arg max
j=1,··· ,Ne
(
1− 1
1 + tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,j
)) . (63)
Consequently,
1
1+tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,jm
)≥E
 11+h˜Hk Λopk h˜k+tr(Λop\kR˜k)
 (64)
tr
(
Λopk Rˇeve,jm
)≥ tr (Λopk Rˇeve,j) , j = 1, · · · , Ne. (65)
Notice that for the mth beam of the kth user, we have
[R˜eve]mm ≥ [R˜k]mm, which indicates that r˜eve,m ≥ r˜k,m
with
∑Ne
j=1 rˇeve,j,m = r˜eve,m. Then, if λ
op
k,m 6= 0, from the
equation (58), we can obtain (66) at the top of the this page.
where (a) follows from the stochastic independence between
the elements of h˜k and Lemma 1, while (b) can be directly
obtained from (64)-(65) and
∑Ne
j=1 rˇeve,j,m = r˜eve,m. Owing
to µop < 0 does not satisfy the KKT condition in (57),
consequently, λopk,m = 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The cost function of the problem in (37) can be defined as
L =
∑
k
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
−
∑
k
tr
( ∂
∂Λk
∑
l
Rl,2(Λ(i)1 , · · · ,Λ(i)K )
)T
Λk

+
K∑
k=1
tr (ΨkΛk)− µ
(
tr
(∑
k
Λk
)
− P
)
(67)
where the Lagrange multipliers Ψk  0 and µ ≥ 0 are related
to the problem constraints.
From (29), the gradient of Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) with respect
to Λk can be expressed as
∂
∂Λk
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = (I + ΓkΛk)−1 Γk
+
∑
m,n
∂Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
∂
[
η˜k
(
Φ−1k Λk
)]
mn
∂
[
η˜k
(
Φ−1k Λk
)]
mn
∂Λk
+
∑
m,n
∂Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
∂
[
ηk
(
Φ˜−1k K¯
−1
k
)]
mn
∂
[
ηk
(
Φ˜−1k K¯
−1
k
)]
mn
∂Λk
. (68)
12
γ
(i+1)
k,m
1+γ
(i+1)
k,m λ
(i+1)
k,m
+
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇl,m,j
γ˜
(i+1)
l,j +tr
(
Rˇl,jΛ
(i+1)
\l
) = δ(i)k,m + µ(i+1), µ(i+1) < ν(i+1)k,m − δ(i)k,m
λ
(i+1)
k,m = 0, µ
(i+1) ≥ ν(i+1)k,m − δ(i)k,m
(80)
C¯(i)(X¯1, · · · , X¯K) ≤ C˜(i)
(
1
KM
X¯1 +
KM − 1
KM
X
(t)
1 , · · · ,
1
KM
X¯K +
KM − 1
KM
X
(t)
K
)
(84)
C˜(i)(X
(t)
1 , · · · ,X(t)K ) ≤ C˜(i)
(
1
KM
X¯1 +
KM − 1
KM
X
(t)
1 , · · · ,
1
KM
X¯K +
KM − 1
KM
X
(t)
K
)
(85)
Using methods similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4 in
[11], we obtain
∂Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
∂
[
η˜k
(
Φ−1k Λk
)]
mn
= 0 (69)
∂Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK)
∂
[
ηk
(
Φ˜−1k K¯
−1
k
)]
mn
= 0. (70)
Thus, we have
∂
∂Λk
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = (I + ΓkΛk)−1 Γk. (71)
Then, similarly to process of obtaining the gradient of
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) with respect to Λk, we can obtain the
gradient of Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) with respect to Λk′ , k′ 6= k.
We have
∂
∂Λk′
Rk,1(Λ1,· · ·,ΛK) =
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇk′,j
γ˜k′,j + tr
(
Λ\k′Rˇk′,j
) . (72)
Therefore, from (71)-(72), we have
∂
∂Λa
∑
k
Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) = (I + ΓaΛa)−1 Γa
+
K∑
l 6=a
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇl,j
γ˜l,j + tr
(
Λ\lRˇl,j
) . (73)
Moreover, the derivative of
∑
lRl,2(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) with
respect to Λk can be expressed as
∂
∂Λk
∑
l
Rl,2(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) =
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇl,j
1 + tr
(
Λ\lRˇl,j
)
+
Ne∑
j=1
Rˇeve,j
1 + tr
(
ΛkRˇeve,j
) . (74)
Due to the fact that Rk,1(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK) is strictly concave on
(Λ1, · · · ,ΛK), the KKT conditions of (37) are
∂L
∂Λ
(i+1)
a
= 0, a = 1, · · · ,K (75)
tr
(
Ψ(i+1)a Λ
(i+1)
a
)
= 0, Ψ(i+1)a  0, Λ(i+1)a  0 (76)
µ(i+1)
(
tr
(∑
k
Λ
(i+1)
k
)
− P
)
= 0, µ(i+1) ≥ 0. (77)
Since problem in (37) is a convex optimization problem,
the optimal solution Λ(i+1)k can be determined by solving the
KKT conditions. We rewrite the first KKT condition (75) as
∂L
∂Λ
(i+1)
a
=
(
I + Γ(i+1)a Λ
(i+1)
a
)−1
Γ(i+1)a
+
K∑
l 6=a
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇl,j
γ˜
(i+1)
l,j +tr
(
Λ
(i+1)
\l Rˇl,j
)− K∑
l 6=a
Nr∑
j=1
Rˇl,j
1+tr
(
Λ
(i)
\l Rˇl,j
)
−
Ne∑
j=1
Rˇeve,j
1 + tr
(
Λ
(i)
a Rˇeve,j
) + Ψ(i+1)a − µ(i+1)I = 0. (78)
Then, similarly to [5], [11], It can be found that the KKT
conditions (75)-(77) equal to the KKT conditions of the
following optimization problem[
Λ
(i+1)
1 , · · · ,Λ(i+1)K
]
= arg max
Λ1,··· ,ΛK
∑
k
(
log det (I + ΓkΛk)
+ log det
(
Γ˜k + K¯k
)
− tr
(
∆
(i)
k Λk
))
subject to
∑
k
tr (Λk) ≤ P
Λk  0, k = 1, · · · ,K. (79)
Thus, the solution of the iterative problem in (37) is equiv-
alent to that of problem in (79). Using the KKT conditions of
problem in (79), we can find that the optimal solution of (79)
satisfies (80), which is given at the top of this page. In (80),
the auxiliary variable ν(i+1)k,m is given by
ν
(i+1)
k,m = γ
(i+1)
k,m +
K∑
l 6=k
Nr∑
j=1
rˇl,m,j
γ˜
(i+1)
l,j +
∑
(l′,m′)
∈Sk,m,l
rˇl,m′,jλ
(i+1)
l′,m′
(81)
and the Lagrange multiplier µ(i+1) is set to satisfy the KKT
conditions µ(i+1)
(
tr
(∑
k Λ
(i+1)
k
)
− P
)
= 0 and µ(i+1) ≥
0.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Here, we prove the convergence of the sequence{
X
(t)
1 ,· · ·,X(t)K
}∞
t=0
. To prove the convergence of the proposed
IWFA, a function for given (X(t)1 ,· · ·,X(t)K ) is defined as
C¯(i)(X1, · · · ,XK) = 1
KM
K∑
k
M∑
m
(
log
(
1 + γ
(i)
k,mxk,m
)
+
∑
k′ 6=k
Nr∑
j
log
(
γ˜
(i)
k′,j + rˇk′,m,jxk,m +
∑
(l,m′)
∈Sk,m,k′
rˇk′,m′,jx
(t)
l,m′
)
− δ(i)k,mxk,m +
∑
(k′,m′)
6=(k,m)
log
(
1 + γ
(i)
k′,m′x
(t)
k′,m′
)
+
Nr∑
j
log
(˜
γ
(i)
k,j+
∑
l 6=k
∑
m′
rˇk,m′,jx
(t)
l,m′
)
−
∑
(l,m′)
6=(k,m)
δ
(i)
l,m′x
(t)
l,m′
)
. (82)
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It can be seen that C¯(i)(X1, · · · ,XK) is a concave function
with respect to (X1, · · · ,XK). For given (X(t)1 , · · · ,X(t)K )
subject to the power constraint
∑
k,m xk,m ≤ P , the
(X¯1, · · · , X¯K) generated in Step 14 of IWFA is exactly equal
to the solution of maximizing C¯(i)(X1, · · · ,XK). Hence, with
the (X¯1, · · · , X¯K) obtained from Step 14 of the IWFA, we
have the following result
C¯(i)(X¯1, · · · , X¯K) ≥ C¯(i)(X(t)1 , · · · ,X(t)K )
= C˜(i)(X
(t)
1 , · · · ,X(t)K ). (83)
From the concavity of C˜(i)(X1, · · · ,XK), it can be shown
that (84) holds. Then, combing (83) and (84), we have the
inequality (85). Note that both (84) and (85) are given at the
top of the previous page.
Therefore, after Step 20 of the IWFA, we have that
C˜(i)(X
(t+1)
1 ,· · ·,X(t+1)K )≥ C˜(i)(X(t)1 ,· · ·,X(t)K ). Furthermore,
the problem in (40) is a convex problem. Thus, the generated
(X
(t+1)
1 ,· · ·,X(t+1)K ) will be convergent.
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